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SUMMARY
NASA's Langley Research Center is the oldest of all the NASA Centers.
Many of its pressure systems were fabricated in the 1920's, and are
still in service today. To ensure the continued safe operation of
these systems, NASA-Langley has initiated a pressure-system
recertification program. The procedures for recertifying these
pressure systems are reviewed in this paper. Generally, the analysis
and inspection requirements outlined in the appropriate national
consensus codes are followed. In some instances the requirements of
these codes are not met. In these instances, the systems are
analyzed further, repaired, modified and/or tested todemonstrate
their structural integrity.
*Head, Fracture Mechanics Engineering Section, Structural Design
Branch, Facilities Engineering Division
**Head, Structural Design Branch, Facilities Engineering Division
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INTRODUCTION
NASA's Langley Research Center is the oldest of all the NASA Centers.
Many of its pressure systems were fabricated in the 1920's, and are
still in service today. To ensure the continued safe operation
of these systems, NASA-Langley has initiated a pressure-system
recertificatlon program. This program employs modern analyses
and the latest inspection techniques to evaluate the structural
integrity of these systems. This paper describes (a) the
rationale behind NASA-Langley's recertification program; and
(b) some procedures for dealing with problem areas.
RATIONALE FOR PRESSURE VESSEL ANALYSIS
Under NASA-Langley's recertification program, pressure vessels fall
into two general categories: (i) vessels carrying the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code Stmmp; and (2) vessels which do not carry
the Code stamp. The procedures for recertifying both categories of
vessels are described as follows:
Code-Stamped Vessels
Code stamping of a vessel by a manufacturer certifies that the
vessel has been designed and fabricated in accordance with a
section of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME
B&PV Code). No additional analysis is performed in recertifying
Code-stamped vessels. However_ these vessels are inspected as described
in the Nondestructive Examination section of this paper.
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Non-Code-Stamped Vessels
These vessels are analyzed using the criteria of the current issue
of either (i) Section VIII, Division i; (2) Section VIII, Division 2;
or (3) Code Case 1205-5 of the ASME B&PV Code, References i, 2, and
3 respectively. Use of these criteria does not qualify the vessels
for Code stamping. However, these criteria do provide a rational
guide for evaluating the integrity of the vessels, and the criteria
are used as such.
Section VIII, Division 1 (referred to hereinafter as Division i):
Welded and riveted vessels are initially analyzed using the criteria
of Division i. This Division generally requires (i) continuum
analyses of the vessels; and (2) that numerous design rules be
followed. Depending upon the materials and joint efficiencies
used, Division 1 allows a range of 0 percent to 100 percent radiographic
inspection of structurally significant welds. Division 1 does have
stringent requirements on vessel configuration, e.g. on the slopes
at head-to-cylinder and conelto-cylinder junctions and on the radii
on the outside-corners of nozzles.
Section VIII, Division 2 (referred tO hereinafter as Division 2):
In some instances, welded vessels satisfy the requirements of
Division 1 only when their maximum allowable working pressures are
reduced below NASA's operational requirements. In these instances,
thevessels are analyzed using Division 2. This Division permits
higher allowable stresses, and consequently higher pressures, in
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a given vessel. However, Division 2 generally requires detailed
stress, thermal and fatigue analyses of the vessels. It is (i) more
restrictive on configurations and materials than Division i; and
(2) generally more expensive and time-consuming than Df_ision i.
Further, Division 2 generally requires i00 percent radiographic
inspection of structurally significant welds.
Examples: Reference 4 describes in detail the recertification of a
135 psig (0.93 MPa) wind tunnel by using the Division 1 criteria.
Reference 5 describes the recertification of twelve 6000 psi (41.4 MPa)
laminated air storage vessels by using the Division 2 criteria.
Code Case 1205-5 (referred to hereinafter as CC 1205-5):
Integrally forged vessels are initially analyzed using the criteria
of CC 1205-5. This Code Case (I) applies only to integrally forged
vessels and (2) severely restricts the construction, configuration
and usage of the vessels. For example, (i) the vessels must be
fabricated of SA-372, Class I, II, III, IV or V steel only; (2)
the maximum inside diameter of the vessels is 24 inches (609.6 _m);
and (3) the usage temperature range of the vessels is minus 20°F
to plus 200°F (244 to 367K).
CC 1205-5 is used in recertifying integrally forged vessels because
it permits higher allowable stresses than Division i, but does not
require the expensive and time-consuming analyses which Division 2
requires.
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Integrally forgedvessels which do not meet the criteria of CC 1205-5
are analyzed using the Division 2 criteria.
RATIONALEFOR PIPING ANALYSIS
Piping components are analyzed using the criteria of the current
issue of the Chemical and Petroleum Refinery Piping Code (referred
to hereinafter as ANSI B31.3), Reference 6. This Code applies to
piping handling all liquids and gases. It requires a detailed
analysis of the piping, and radiographic inspection of 5 percent
of all butt welds, except for welds subjected to severe cyclic
stresses. These latter welds require 100 percent radiographic inspection.
RECERTIFICATION PRACTICE
Field Survey
NASA Management Instruction NMI 1710.3A requires that, to the maximum extent
possible, pressure systems be designed and fabricated in accordance
with the applicable codes. (Deviations are permitted, but additional
analyses and tests are required to demonstrate that the safety of
personnel and equipment are not compromised.) The first step in
meeting these regulations is to identify every component in a given
system. For the older systems, there is rarely any documentation
on these components. Consequently, field surveys must be made to
assemble data on pressure vessel configurations, pipe sizes and
schedules, flange and valve pound-class ratings, and manufacturers'
pressure ratings. These field surveys also identify the location
of all welds and support structures.
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Frequently, the information required for component analysis is
simply not available. The following paragraphs cite several
ways of dealing with this lack of information.
o The materials used to fabricate components are frequently not
identified. Whenever feasible, sections of these materials are
removed and both hardness and x-ray fluorescence tests conducted.
These tests generally yield good indications of thetensile
strength and chemical properties of the materials.
In some cases, it is infeasible to remove a section of material.
The material is then assumed to be fabricated of the lowest
strength material available in the applicable Code. Table 1
presents the materials assumed for various applications.
o Flanges are occasionally found which cannot be reasonably analyzed
using the criteria of Division i. In one case, 616 identical
flanges were found. The maximum allowable working pressure for
these flanges was established by proof testing one flange according
to the procedures outlined in Paragraph UG-101, Proof Tests
to Establish Maximum Allowable Working Pressure, of Division
i.
o Many components are located which are made of known, but not
Code-approved materials. For these components, the "Basis for
Establishing Stress Values" section of the appropriate Code
is used to determine allowable stresses.
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The Charpy impact energies for these materials are obtained
from the technical literature. System operating temperatures
are modified, if necessary, to ensure that these materials
have the impact energies required by the Codes. See References
4 and 5 for example.
Evaluation
Once all of the components have been identified, they are analyzed.
The maximum allowable working pressures for vessels and piping
are determined using the procedures described in the RATIONALE
sections of this paper. The maximum allowable working pressures
for components, e.g. switches, flow meters, gages, etc., are
determined from the manufacturers' pressure ratings for the
components.
If the analysis shows that all components are adequate for the
system working pressure, the analysis•portion of recertification is
complete. The components that are not adequate are either replaced
or the system operating pressure is reduced.
Nondestructive Examination
Table 2 describes the nondestructive examinations which are normally
performed during pressure system recertification. If no unacceptable
indications are found during these examinations, a system is considered
as recertified. If unacceptable indications are found, some action is
taken to ensure personnel safety and system integrity. The following
section of this paper describes some of the actions taken.
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Unacceptable-Indication Management
Normally unacceptable indications are either ground out and repair
weldede or the component is removed from service. In some cases,
however, such repairs are not desirable--for example, when greater damage
may be done by repairing the indication than by leaving it, when the
repair costs are excessive, or when repair funds are not available.
The procedures followed in dealing with several of these cases are
described in the following paragraphs.
An unacceptable slag inclusion was found ina 3 i/8-inch (79.4 mm)
thick flange-to-pipe weld. This inclusion was approximately 2 3/4
inches (69.9 mm) from the outside surface of the pipe and
inaccessible from the inside of the pipe. To repair the inclusion,
a large quantity of weld metal would have to be ground away and
the ground-out area repair welded. Because the repair welding was
so localized, NASA-Langley's engineering staff was concerned that
the flange might warp and no longer match its mating flange.
The stresses introduced in forcing these flanges together could easily
be more deleterious than the slag inclusion. Consequently, a
fracture mechanics analysis was performed to determine whether the
inclusion compromised the integrity of the weld. Tri-stereo radiographs
were used to determine the dimensions of the inclusion. These
dimensions were subsequently confirmed using ultrasonic techniques.
The stresses acting across the defect were determined from a detailed
stress analysis of the defect area. The procedures specified in
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Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code, Reference 7, were then followed
for the fracture mechanics analysis. This analysis showed (i) the
' inclusion would cause a leak-before-burst failure of the pipe; and
(2) the flaw could experience over 300,000 full-pressure cycles before
reaching an unacceptable length according to Reference 7 (i.e.
before the flaw reached one-tenth of the critical flaw size).
Based on this analysis, the inclusion was left in the weld, and
its size is monitored regularly todetect any anomalous growth.
Similar procedures were followed in certifying a bearing-case support
strut in NASA-Langley's National Transonic Facility (NTF). A
slag inclusion was found in one of the welds in the support strut.
Removal of the inclusion and repair welding of the resulting gouge
would probably misalign the bearing case. This misalignment would
be difficult, if not impossible, to correct. Consequently, tri-stereo
radiographs were used to determine the dimensions of the inclusion,
a detailed stress analysis of the defect area was performed and a
fracture mechanics analysis completed. The predicted life of the
strut exceeds the expected operating Ii9_ of the NTF by a factor of seven.
Thus the slag inclusion was left in the strut.
Numerous cracks were found in the longitudinal welds of 167 air
storage vessels at NASA-Langley. These vessels were fabricated by
rolling the cylindrical portions of the vessels to the desired radius
and flash welding the longitudinal seams together. Unfortunately,
• this process left large numbers of cracks (20 to 80 per vessel) in
the longitudinal welds. Repairing all of these cracks would be
extremely expensive. Consequently, fracture mechanics analyses
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were performed to determine if some of the cracks could be
safely left in the vessels. The analysis showed that nearly
three-quarters of the cracks would not propagate to failure in
i00,000 full-pressure cycles (20 times the required life of
the vessels).
In order to verify the results of the fracture mechanics analysis,
a test vessel was fabricated from one of the existing vessels. This
test vessel contained a number of cracks which were predicted to
have lives greater than 100,000 cycles. The test vessel was
fatigue cycled for 100,000 full-pressure cycles and none of the
cracks did propagate to failure. Thus the fracture mechanics
analysis was verified, and only one-quarter of the cracks in the
longitudinal welds will be repaired.
Fracture mechanics is a relatively new science and has only been
used extensively in the aircraft industry. However, the ability
of fracture mechanics to accurately predict flaw growth and fracture
has been demonstrated frequently. (See References 8 and 9 for
example.) Consequently this analysis tool will be used with increasing
frequency in other industries as well.
FUTURE INSPECTIONS
Once a system has been recertified, a future inspection plan
is developed. Under this plan, the areas experiencing high
and/or cyclic stresses are regularly inspected to locate any
defects which might subsequently develop. As appropriate, dye
penetrant, magnetic particle, ultrasonic, radiographic and
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visual techniques are used in these inspections. Reference
i0 presents the recommended inspection intervals for systems
having different system volumes and contents. (Table IX,
Reference 5 shows the details of a typical inspection plan.)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The procedures for recertifying pressure systems at NASA-Langley
Research Center are reviewed in this paper. Generally, the
analysis and inspection requirements outlined in the appropriate
national consensus codes are followed in recertifying these
systems. In some instances the requirements of these codes
are not met. Usually, these systems are modified so that the
requirements are met. However, where repair costs are excessive
or good judgement indicates that repairs may do more harm than
good, additional analyses and/or tests are performed to recertify
the system.
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TABLE i. Materials Assumed for Various Applications
Application Material Kssumed
Carbon steel pipe ASTM A53 Gr. A
Carbon steel fittings ASTM A234 Gr. WPA
Carbon steel forgings ASTM AI81 Gr. I
Stainless steel pipe ASTM A312 Gr. TP304L
Stainless steel fittings ASTM A182 Gr. 304L
Stainless steel forgings ASTM A182 Gr. F304L
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TABLE 2. NondestructiveExaminations Normally Performed
During System Recertification
s
Component Nondestructive Examination
Code-Stamped Vessels High stressed areas and fillet welds
are surface inspected using visual,
magnetic particle and/or dye
penetrant techniques.
Non-Code-Stamped Same as Code-Stamped Vessels, plus
Vessels, Section VIII, a minimum of 10% of all structurally
Division 1 Analysis significant welds are radiographed.
A higher percentage may be radio-
graphed if higher joint efficiencies
are required.
Non-Code-Stamped Same as Code-Stamped Vessels, plus
Vessels, Section VIII, 100% of all structurally significant
Division 2 Analysis welds are radiographed.
Non-Code-Stamped The nozzles are surface inspected
Vessels, CC 1205-5 using visual, magnetic particle
Analysis and/or dye penetrant techniques.
Piping Same as Code-Stamped Vessels, plus
10% of all welds are radiographed.
All 100% of all structurally significant
welds are radiographed if unacceptable
defects are found in initial inspections.
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